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INTRODUCTION
Increased requirements for safety and efficiency as well as
increased availability of reliable and inexpensive computer
technology has resulted in a trend of more and more computers
being employed in flight management. However, this trend by no
means indicates that human operators will disappear from aircraft
cockpits. Instead, it means that the roles of the pilot,
copilot, and flight engineer will evolve to include increased
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising the various
computer—based systems employed in the aircraft.
p	 While this assessment of the future roles of tht: members of
the flight crew is fairly easy to accept, it is certainly not
f	
straightforward to decide how various flight tasks should be^-a
s
allocated among humans and computers. Further, it is not clear
how humans and computers should communicate regarding the
.	 g	 gprocessP
by which their tasks are performed and the products that result.
This report discusses progress of a research program whose
overall objectives include providing at least partial answers to
some of the questions surrounding these issues.
The following two sections discuss two project areas which
are currently being pursued in this program of research: 1) the
intelligent cockpit and 2) studies of human problem solving. The
first area	 fz	 involves an investigation of the use of advanced
software engineering methods (e.g., from artificial intelligence)
^.
	to aid aircraft crews in procedure selection and execution. The
	 i
ii
second area is focused on human problem solving in dynamic
k•
i
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environments as affected by the human's level of knowledge of
system operations. Both of these efforts are producing results 	
r
that are planned to be tested further in the Center's new
full--scale simulation facilty. 	 Progress on developing this
0
J
facility is discussed in the third and final section of this
progress report.
EEi
1
r
	 t
N
f
i
V
^v
E.
^t
.o
E.
A uy^ .v
WJ
THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT
This project is a direct descendent of work by the authors
on human-computer interaction in the cockpit dating back to 1975.
As this research has evolved, the modeling and analysis methods
that have emerged have enabled consideration of increasingly
complex domains. For example, two of the more recent sets of
studies	 considered pilot	 (and	 crew) problem solving in
full-mission simulation studies [Rouse et al., 1982;
	 Johannsen
and Rouse, 19831.
The perspectives provided by these years of research have
resulted in an integrated computer aiding concept which the
authors have termed the "intelligent cockpit." The overall
outline of this concept is outlined in Hammer and Rouse [1982].
The basic idea is to use advanced software engineering methods
(e.g., from artificial intelligence) and models of human decision
making and problem solving to produce a computer-based aid that
"understands" what is going on in the cockpit and can provide
assistance accordingly.
This very ambitious project is being pursued in an
incremental manner. The first increment is an intelligent flight
management aid that understands the nature of procedures and can
monitor their execution.	 The paver by John Hammer in the
Appendix of this report summarizes this work. The results
reported in this paper prove the soundness of the concepts; the
next stage will be to implement this idea in the Center's
simulator to allow full-scale testing.
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STUDIES OF HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING
In order to support domain-oriented projects such as the
intelligent cockpit. it is necessary to increase our basic 	
a
understanding of human decision making and problem solving. This
i
has been a main tenet of this program of research since its
inception and continues to be a guiding principle.
The latest efforts in the area of basic studies of human
11p1 -	 problem solving have focused on the question of what humans need
l
'IF to know about a dynamic process in order to be able to deal
successfully with unfamiliar and unanticipated events. The paper
by Nancy Morris in the Appendix of this report summarizes the
,.
	 results	 of	 a study that compared knowledge of operating
f
procedures and physical principles in a process control task.
One of the most interesting results was that knowledge of
physical principles, as assessed via a written test, did not
r	
result in improved performance.	 Of the many important issues	 i
that this raises, two of particular note are the nature of
training (e.g., "what" vs. "how") and the appropriate forms for
different types of knowledge.
FLIGHT SIMULATION SOFTWARE
The progress report for the last reporting period discussed
the hardware modifications planned for the Center's DC-8
simulator in order to create an advanced cockpit simulator. This
section focuses on software developments.
W,
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Software has been developed to produce a B-747 flight:
simulation on the Center's Vax 11/780. At this point in time, it
employs simplified dynamics to simulate the motion of an aircraft
and only a few of the essential subsystems. Despite this
simplicity, the software meets our overall need to provide pilots
with a reasonably realistic environment for the purpose of
investigating their problem solving behavior	 in various
situations.
I
I^
t
A
The program allows the pilot to activate the control
surfaces of the jet aircraft. adjust engine thrust, and tune
navigational radio equipment. The program responds to commands
by adjusting aircraft attitude to match the control surfaces and
updating the instrument panel display as the trajectory of the
aircraft evolves through space.
An instrument panel ,gas designed to display informse.i:ion that
comes from the flight simulation. This information is composed
of current aircraft attitude. positions of switches. flight
situation, and navigational environment. Included are pitch.
altitude, engine thrust, compass, fuel, landing gear, brake. VOR
system, stall warning, VLF OMEGA, ILS, VHF channel, etc. This
brief panel gives the pilot all the basic flight information he
needs during the three primary mission phases (i.e., takeoff,
navigation, and landing) using standard flight procedures and
radio faci i_cies.
^>	 4
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Although the pilot completely controls 	 the	 motion
	 of	 the
~
r^
jet,	 wind	 forces	 that	 vary	 with altitude	 can influence the
flight.	 An analytical combination of jet and wind motion	 yields
" n r the true position of the jet relative to the earth's surface.
This simulation software, however, is'still incomplete. The
	
l
-	 current interface--keyboard and screen--are suitable for software
i
development but will have to change to use the simulator displays
and controls.	 The existing single instrument panel must be
^P
rearranged into several different CRT's. The flight control will
be executed by a pilot who will be sitting down in a full scale
	
M`, fi r	 aircraft cockpit facility and using a control stick and a flight
	
a.	 deck of high fidelity.
R '
i
Also,	 more subsystems will	 be	 involved	 to
'
cover	 all
information	 that would	 be necessary	 for	 a realistic problem
' solving environment. 	 Among these	 subsystems
	
are the	 engines
(giving	 engine pressure ratio,	 fuel	 flow, exhaust	 gas
;• temperature, etc.), hydraulic system, autopilot, fuel. CDTI.	 eta;.
a,
With	 all	 these subsystems, it	 is	 believed	 that the flight
i
j^
simulator will be an	 appropriate base	 2or	 studies of	 aiding
problem solving.
l^
r
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AN INTELLIGENT FLIGHT MANAGEMENT AID FOR PROCEDURE EXECUTION
John M. Hammer
Center for Man--Machine Systems Research
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia 30332
B
ABSTRACT
A computer program is described which contains a model of
the procedures used in the operation of a twin engine aircraft.
a
This program, by comparing the model to the aircraft state, can
determine when a procedure (or checklist) should be or is invoked
and when each step (detectable by a change in the aircraft state) 	 i
is completed.	 Thus, the program tracks the flight crew's
procedure execution through changes in the aircraft state. Data
was used for evaluation from an earlier experiment on a Link
GAT-II simulator. The program was able to identify practically
all of the errors identified by hand as well as locate some that 	 f
had been missed by human judges. It is felt that this model
could signficantly aid flight crews. 	 j
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INTRODUCTION
A computer program for detecting pilot error is described.
This program observes pilot actions through the aircraft controls
and state. These actions are compared to those of a procedure
script, which can be considered a prescriptive model of the
procedural aspects of flight. A pilot error, then, is a
discrepancy between the pilot actions and the script. The
program is capable of	 detecting
	
omitted,
	 incorrect,	 or
out-of-order steps as well as certain irrelevant actions.
This procedural aid is part of a larger research thrust
known as the intel.jjg" co .it. Its goals are to demonstrate
concepts for a system capable of intelligent deciAion-aiding in
flight management.	 For example, Hammer and Rouse [1982] have
identified a number of levels at which aiding could occur. At
the lowest level, computerized warning, calculation, and display
control could, if implemented properly, improve the human factors
of the cockpit.	 Most flight deck automation is concerned with
this level [Wiener and Curry 19801.
	
At a second level; , the
computer could check that certain conditions were met and infer
the intentions of the flight crew. For example, the system
described later checks pilot actions against a prescribed plan
and infers what procedure the crew should be following. At the
highest level, the computer could compensate for and advise the
pilot. Compensation could mean taking over some task that had
been allocated to the pilot or correcting for pilot error.
Advice could take the form of a natural language dialogue on some
cooperative human-computer problem solving. Both of these forms
!I
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of aiding are beyond the current state of the art.
I^	 ,g^,o b,^,^ .^ to t em e n t
x^.
Currently, pilot error 	 (that goes undetected by 	 the	 pilot)
I
is	 found	 by	 humans	 who examine simulator traces (as above) or
R
cockpit voice recordings.	 It would be	 better
	 to	 detect	 these
errors	 seconds after they occurred while there was still time to
{ correct them.
	
This was the goal of the research
	 reported	 here.
Software	 was written to implement a model of procedure execution
during flight.	 The model is	 continually	 updated	 (steps	 noted
1 done, procedures invoked and finished) during the flight so as to
R keep it close to what the flight crew is doing. 	 TJ,, e model	 could
be	 used	 as	 an	 aid	 since	 it has some understanding of when a
proc;edure is to be used	 and	 what	 its	 execution	 entails.	 To
evaluate	 the	 model,	 it was tested on earlier simulator flights
X with previously indentified errors.	 The figure of merit was
	 the
number of these errors that the model could locate.
u=
IT	 The remainder of this article contains sections on previous
work on procedural error, programming methodologies for
procedural aiding, the pilot's procedures, the internal program
organization of the aid, evaluations of the aid, and conclusions.
PREVIOUS WORK
Humans occasionally err when following procedures. The
forms of error have frequently been observed to be steps not
executed, done out-of-order, done incompletely, or done at the
wrong time.	 The same is true of whole procedures, which are
{
1
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E	 sometimes incorrectly selected for execution.
	 Some theories	 5''
[Norman 19811 and many classification schemes [Rasmussen 19791
Irianan 19791 [van Eekhaut and Rouse 19811 have been put forth,
and are reviewed in Rouse and Rouse [1983). The theories and
classification schemes will not be reviewed here, since the goal
is to build an aid for reducing error, not to explain it.
The remainder of this literature review contains two parts:
one on other aids for reducing procedural error, and a second on
t
a line of research leading directly to this research.
Goodstein	 [19791	 has	 proposed	 a	 computerized.
	 procedure
display	 system.
	
Its	 design	 was	 based on the belief that the
operator executes procedures with some goal in mind
	
__	 changing i
the	 system	 via	 procedures	 from	 one	 state	 to	 another.
4
Consequently,
	
the sys'.. rti explicitly displays this hierarchy.
	
The
procedure	 envi mart ;aunt	 is	 also	 enriched	 by	 including
preconditions, constraints, and warnings along with the procedure
text.
The	 proposed	 system
	
was	 to	 be	 implemented
	 with	 three F1
displays.	 The first would display the sequence of procedures to
be followed.	 Included in this would be	 the	 status
	 of	 various
procedures	 (e.g.,	 on hold or waiting for the plant to respond).
The second display would contain the text of a	 single	 procedure
along with supplemental preconditions, constraints, and warnings.
i^
The third display is for support.	 It might display the
	 relevant {
plant	 status	 so	 that	 the operator would not have to walk away M
from the	 displays	 just	 to	 read	 an	 instrument.
	 While	 this
'
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proposed	 three	 display	 system	 would seem to be an improvement
i1 over current practice,	 it does not appear to have been 	 evaluated
with human operator::. t
Colley	 [1982]
	 and Seeman et al.
	
[1982)	 are in	 the	 process
of developing a computerized procedure support system for nuclear
power plant operators. 	 The system
	 compares	 the	 current	 plant
state
	
to a set of desirable, or safe, plant states.
	 A procedure
a
is then generated by the computer to transform the plant
	 to	 the
nearest safe state.
	 A practical advantage of automatic procedure
generation is that a potentially larger set of
	
procedures	 could
be	 available 	 tha	 ou d	 from	 hardca	 F	 t	 t-n	 w	 l	 	 	 py.	 or	 he la 1.er,	 the
system
	 designers	 cannot	 afford	 to	 create
	 every	 possible
R
procedure,,	 of	 a computer could derive the procedures from some
6
general	 principles,	 automatic	 generation	 could	 represent	 a
considerable improvement. '!
The current system ca ►i produce procedures 	 for	 an	 eighteen
component	 lubrication
	
system.
	
The	 procedures	 are	 generated
dynamically;	 i.e.,	 after	 each	 operator
	
action,	 the	 system
f
regenerates	 an	 appropriate	 procedure.	 Thus,	 if the operator
s errs, an appropriate change will appear in 	 the	 procedure	 text.
The
	
development effort should be viewed as an attempt to produce
a methodology for procedure generation.
	 It	 has	 not _yet
	 been
J
tested on operators.
f
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jThis section discusses a sequence of studies that lead to
r,
r	 -	 the work presented in this article.
	 Rouse and Rouse [3980]
studied displays for procedures in an abstract. scenario.	 Three
displays were used: a traditional hardcopy, a practically
identical softcopy (displayed on a CRT screen), and a cued
softcopy that dimmed a procedure step when it had been completed.
To simulate the distractions faced by pilots, an arithmetic sidej
task was added.	 The experimental results showed the cued
softcopy display to be significantly faster and to cause fewer
r	 errors than the o^:.her two displays.
LL
	
	 In a second, similar experiment conducted in a realistic
environment, Rouse, Rouse, and Hammer [19821 studied hardcopy and
 cued procedure displays in a Link GAT-II twin engine aircraft;
simulator.	 Their experiment will be rather carefully described
	 C
because the data from it was reanalyzed for the research reported
C
here.
The aircraft simulator was configured as a Piper Aztec F. A
PDP-IA /40 minicomputer was interfaced to the simulator and
1
recorded timestamped changes of the aircraft state. The record
of a flight, termed a simulator trace, consisted of a sequen\e of
triples, where each triple contained a time, a signal, and a
r^
signal value.	 A signal was recorded only at a, significant
v
4.s.
change, which usually was a deviation of ±10% from its previously
recorded value.	 (It is this data that was analyzed in the
	 j
research reported here.) Also interfaced was a special purpose
LJ
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keyboard that controlled the CRT procedure display, one level of
an independent, display variable. The other level was a
traditional, printed hardcopy procedure.
Subjects flew in normal, emergency, 'and double emergency
flights. The eight subjects were all instrument- and twit;
engine-rated pilots with the exception of one who had 70 hours of
twin engine simulator time and was judged to have been equal to
the ohhers. Subjects flew in 3 flight scenarios. The normal,
flight was a departure, climb to 2000 feet, direct cruise to
another airport, descend, and land. The emergenc y
 flight was a
single engine failure after the aircraft climbed and through 2000
feet. The double emergency failure consisted of a single engine
failure at the same point plus a gear extension failure during
the single engine pre-landing procedure.
The data analysis showed that the hardcopy procedure was 19%
faster than the CRT display (statistically significant at
 p<.025). The CRT display produced 7.5 times fewer errors of the
kind that could possibly be affected by display (p<.025).
A finer grained analysis of the experimental data from the
°	 above experiment appears in [Rouse and Rouse 19831. Forty-threeP	 PP	 ^	 Y
I errors were classified as occurring during hypothesis check, goal
choice, procedure choice, or procedure execution. Errors were
ll a	also classified as incorrect or unnecessary across all of these
four categories.
	 Displays were found to have a significant
effect on errors that were categorized as wrong or incorrect. No
effect was seen on errors classified as unnecessary act'..
10.
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PROGRAMMING METHODOLOG::ES
li	 The most appropriate programming methodology depends on the
type of problem to be solved.	 This is true even though all
i{
methodologies are theoretically equal, since humans may find
j
certain programs easier to expr-!sss in one methodology than
another. Though many methodologies exist, only two will be
discussed here: conventional von Neumann programming [Backus
19781 and symbolic programming.
Conventional programming is often represented by the typical
FORTRAN, BASIC, COBOL, PL/I, and Pascal program. Each
computational, step has one or more input values (or vectors) and
produces a single output value (or vector). The values are
usually numbers or characters. Such a methodology is best suited
1
for numeric or data processing tasks such as aircraft simulator
dynamics or implementing the lowest level of aiding: warning,
calculation, and display control.
Symbolic computation, done primarily in Lisp or perhaps
Prolog, is better suited to higher levels of aiding because the
r
problem the human solves is itself symbolic. In other words, an
aid should use symbolic computing to solve symbolic problems.
The two methodologies employed are rule-based systems and
scripts.
i4
F
I
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A rule-based system (RBS) [Waterman and Hayes-Roth, 19781 is
r one form of symbolic computation often used for an expert system,
a program capable of rivaling human performance in a small but
complex problem domain. Some examples of expert systems are:
1. MYCIN [Shortliffe, 19761 - selects antimicrobial therapy
for infections.
2. DENDRAL [Buchanan et a1., 19691 -	 analyzes	 mass
•	 spectroscopy data to reconstruct the original molecule
from its constituents.
3. PONTIUS-0 [Goldstein and Grimson, 19771 is a system that
• x	 achieves attitude instrument flight.
4. Wesson [19771 has produced a program to perform the
enroute ATC function with performance (under real world
•	 conditions) as good as a human controller.
i
The structure	 of	 a	 RBS	 contains	 two	 principal	 parts:
working	 memory and rules.	 For flight management, working memory
can be assumed to contain the entire state of the aircraft 	 (e.g.
airspeed, altitude,	 pitch,	 roll,	 engine variables, electrical
4 variables) as	 well	 as	 additional	 temporary	 memory.	 A	 rule
contains two parts:	 a situation (such as altitude decreasing or
airspeed > Vx) and an ac iUn (such as a procedure or storing some
!j value	 in working memory).	 The following example shows possible
rules for the pilot's handling engine failure during takeoff:
..N
MPS
ftV	 f
^a
.	
1
i
-	 >	 ^: S amt s s:!"^%^. ^± 4	c: 1	 J
Page 10
q
ACTION
close throttles
stop on runway
abort flight
close throttles
stop on runway
accelerate to Vx
maintain control and speed
clean up aircraft
climb
secure engine
land as soon as possible
RULE	 SITUATION
1. airspeed < Vmc
2. Vmc < airspeed < Vx
3. VMC < airspeed < Vx
and sufficient runway
4. Vx < airspeed
4
i
u
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The rules operate as follows. If the airspeed S VDIC when
one engine fails (the aircraft is in contact with the runway),
the situation of rule 1 applies, and the flight is aborted as per
the action of rule 1. Rule 3 gives a further example of how
rules are invoked. If Rule 3 is applied, airspeed will be
increased to at least Vx, at which time Rule 4 applies. Thus,
one rule may transfer control to another rule either by a change
in the aircraft state as in this example or in temporary memory
(not illustrated).
In the system discussed here, rules are used primarily for
their ability to recognize situations. In other words, rules
detect pilot actions and changes in the aircraft state (e.g.,
landing gear up) that indicate a new mode of operation (e.g.,
from on the ground to airborne). The rules, however, are not
self--organized; they are 'g eld together by scripts.
s
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The script [Schank and Abelson 1977], the final programming
methodology discussed here, is a form of symbolic computation
like rule-based systems. Where a RBS recognizes specific
situations and invokes the corresponding actions, a script
describes the expected actors and actions in some situation. The
script is a construct similar to the frame [Minsky, 19751 and to
schema or template [Bartlett, 19321.
As an example of how the script concept might app?,,,
consider a script for landing an airplane. The landing script
provides the desired aircraft configuration -- engine settings,
flaps, gear -- and their changes over time. Some of these will
be dependent on the airport, and hence the landing script will
have airport-dependent parameters. In addition, the landing
script will indicate the scripts most likely to be activated next
-- taxi, go-around, travel to an alternate airport, etc.
The power of scripts comes both from their rich description
of actions and from the ability to determine which script is
really active.	 The original application	 of	 scripts	 was
understanding	 natural language (e.g., English).
	
In spoken
language, the speaker will, in the interest of economy, omit many
details that the listener can infer. A script provides
background for the computer so that it might draw some of the
same inferences that a human would. To determine the next active
script is a matter of selecting the script that best matches the
current facts.
+a
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r	 R In a similar way, scripts can be	 used	 to	 infer	 what	 the ^^.
flight	 crew is doing.	 The various controls and switch settings,
t'jr sensed by the computer, can be viewed as a stream of details that
partially	 conveys	 the flight crew's current thinking.
	 By using
scripts, the computer should be able to infer the full details in
much	 the	 same way as it is used to understand natural language.
Vie! In fact, one can envision an "advanced" intelligent cockpit where
^iF
n the computer would use the crew's conversation as one of its data
sources.	 Though
	 this	 may	 seem
	
far-fetched,	 it	 will	 be
demonstrated	 later	 that	 some	 errors could only be detected by
this means.
C
F
PROCEDURES
Because the procedures pilots followed are central
	 to	 this
work,	 an	 example	 is	 given in Figure 1 of a typical
	 	 g	 	 procedure.
1
Some aspects of these procedures will now be given.	 First,	 note
n
T; that	 most	 steps are quite simple, e.g., steps 1 and 2;
	
and the
program senses their completion by a simple
	 examination
	 of	 the
simulator state.	 Second, some steps cannot be sensed because the
required signals are not available to the computer.
	 An	 example
n
is	 step 14;	 instrument vacuum was not recorded. 	 Such steps are
ignored by the	 program	 (deleted	 from	 the	 internal
	 model
	
at
startup).	 Third, some steps call for the pilot to check a sensor
reading.	 The program can check the sensor, but it cannot be sure
the pilot has done so if the sensor reading is acceptable. 	 Steps
10 through 13 are an example. 	 Fourth,
	 sensing	 some	 conditions
G
j
may	 be	 difficult
	 because	 the	 changes	 were not logged in the
. t	 .
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simulator trace because they were too small. For example, step 7
requires a 175 rpm drop, which is about 8% of the existing 2300
C
a	 rpm. This change was unlikely to have been recorded in this
data.	 Thus, the program can observe the magneto grounding but
not its effect on engine rpm. This same problem also occurs when
the	 pilot fine tunes the engines (leans mixture, changes
propeller), as these changes are typically too small to be
u recorded. Of course, the problem of unavailable data would not
be a problem in a real aircraft or in simulator data collection
with a high sampling rate.
Some aspects of the simulator and aircraft in	 general
	 make
the	 sensing	 of	 steps	 more complex than it would first appear.
First,	 some changes require time to occur. For example, in	 step
5,	 the	 propeller feather switch, which is discrete, may precede
.j by a second	 the	 actual	 change	 of	 the propeller.	 A	 second
difficulty	 is	 properly	 sensing temporary states.	 Two steps in
the shutdown procedure, not shown, are
	 an example.	 One	 is	 a
u momentary	 interruption	 of	 the	 magnetos and	 the	 other	 is a
complete shutdown	 to	 stop	 the	 engines. Sensing	 the	 former
requires	 that	 the	 transitions from ON to OFF to ON be observed
within a short time frame.
	 If this were not done,	 the	 program
might misinterpret some other change to the magnetos.
F
INTERNAL PROGRAM STRUCTURE
St	 The internal program structure will first be described in
Ft
	 terms of a single procedure_ step.
	 Next, the hierarchical
organization of steps, procedures, and
	 flight	 phases	 is
rl^
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described.	 Finally, the control structure, which interprets the
steps, procedures, and phases, is described.
The first data structure is the aircraft database, which
contains roughly seventy discrete and continuous signals. Each
input record contains three items: a timestamp, a signal number,
and a signal value*. 	 As the input is read, new values are
inserted in the database.	 Old values are	 not,	 however,
immediately forgotten. Instead, they are retained if they are
less than 6 minutes old or less than 100 in number so that the
program may inspect earlier states.
The second data structure is the internal model of the
procedures used by the crew. An individual procedure step (and
other entities to be discussed later) is represented by the
Pascal record shown in Figure 2. NAME is a text string that is
used for humans to read. CAN EXEC, DONE EXEC, and ABORT EXEC are
rules (expressions that evaluate either true or false) that
determine whether a step's STATE is considered UNSTARTED,
IN__PROGRESS, DONE, or ABORTED according to the transition diagram
shown in Figure 3. For example, for step 1 of the engine start
procedure, the DONE_FXEC rule would check to see that both right
and left mixture controls are currently at the full-rich setting.
ALLOWED et alia are sets of signals that can or cannot
1	 change during the execution of this step. These sets are used to
Imp	 detect actions that should not occur. 	 When a simulator state
change is read, these sets are examined to determine if the
*Other inputs -- keyboard entries, flight obser^-ar signals, etc.
-- were ignored.
r
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TM change is allowed.	 Only steps that are IN-PROGRESS are examined.
Six	 sets	 were found necessary to detect pilot error.
	
Normally,
the program examines ALLOWED	 and	 DISALLOWED	 to	 determine	 the
allowability	 of the signal.	 In engine-out emergency procedures,
steps often refer to controls on
	 the	 operative	 or	 inoperative
engine.	 Thus,	 four	 more sets are necessary for the product of
operative/in-operative with allowed/disallowed.
Procedurg Step Hierarchy
Up to here, procedure	 steps	 have	 been	 described	 without
mentioning
	 their	 surrounding	 context.	 In	 fact,	 there	 is a
hierarchy of four levels, with
	 procedure
	 steps	 at	 the	 lowest
level.
	 A number of steps are collected under a single procedure.
One or	 more	 procedures	 are	 collected
	 under	 a	 phase
	 (e.g.,
pre-flight,	 takeofi'-: )r and all phases are collected under a single
entity FLIGHT.	 Figure 4 illustrates the hierarchy.
	 Each	 circle
in	 Figure	 4 corresponds to one script record as shown in Figure
2.	 Thus, all levels are represented uniformly.
	 PARENT and	 COMP
fields are used to represent the hierarchy.
„4
^ z
^:
The checkoff of procedures and phases is handled just as
	 it
is	 for procedure steps.	 There is some structure imposed on this
process by the hierarchy, however.	 Only when a
	 procedure	 STATE
is	 IN-PROGRESS	 will	 its procedure steps (its subcomponents) be
examined	 for	 transitions	 to	 new	 states.	 Further,	 when	 a
procedure	 is	 DONE	 or	 ABORTED,	 its steps are not examined for
transition.	 The	 structure	 imposes	 a	 preferred	 order
	 of
V left-to-right	 on	 the	 execution
	 of sub-scripts beneath a given
fPage 16
script. The program expects execution in this order, but is
capable of following any order. The program continually examines
u
the DONE rules of all steps beneath an IN_PROGRESS procedure.
The changing of the simulator state causes the rules to evaluate
true in the order that the steps are completed.
The hierarchy also controls testing for allowed changes.
First, only IN_PROGRESS steps, procedures, and phases are
examined. All of the IN_PROGRESS steps are tested to determine
if the signal is in one of the sets. If not, the same tests are
made of IN_PROGRESS procedures, and, if necessary, of the
IN_PROGRESS phases.
E G
	 C	 Proceduresm rc^en V Daemon r eGUr. S anA SubStltu
	RLQCeSlur_Cs
For the normal flight, the procedural hierarchy works well.
During an emergency, flight operations are less structured. For
example, a single engine-out emergency can happen any time the
engines are running and the aircraft is airborne. Consequently,
the procedure(s) for this situation must be available when the
situation demands. Such procedures are termed daemons, and they
were stored in a data structure separate from the normal
procedures.
	 The CAN EXEC; fields of these daemons
	 _
	 look for the
d	
situations in which they are relevant.
A	 second	 modification	 for emergency procedures	 was
substitute
	 procedures.	 For example, in an engine -out emergency,
ee
fe
the regular pre-landing
	
procedure	 is replaced with	 a	 single
engine
	 pre-landing
	
procedure. Substitute procedures	 were
implemented by a pointer from the normal to the substitute.
a
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4	 EV,LUATTON AND RESULTS
The program was evaluated twice. The first time only normal
^;	 R
procedures and normal flights were used. The program was then
I
enhanced for the second evaluation, which used emergency and
!i
double emergency flights. 	 The results for each evaluation are
presented separately below.
e ^ -on a=
The program was first evaluated by developing the program on
ii a	 derivation	 set	 of	 data	 and then running it unmodified on a
validation set.	 The data
	 was	 taken	 from	 normal	 flights	 and
f normal
	
segments	 of	 emergency	 flights	 from
	 the experiment of
[Rouser Rouse, and Hammer, 19821. 	 Flights were assigned randomly
to	 derivation	 and validation data sets.	 As stated earlier, the
objective was for the program to identify all of the errors found u j
•
by Rouse and Rouse	 [19831.
The derivation data contained eight	 errors;	 as	 shown	 in
Table	 1	 the program was able to locate seven of them positively
and give an ambiguous indication of the eighth.
	 This	 one
	 error
rt was	 omission	 of the cruise procedure and was originally located
by examination of verbal transcripts.	 From	 the	 aircraft	 data
recorded	 during the flight,	 the following can be determined.
	 Of
the three steps in the cruise 	 procedure,	 the	 cowl	 flaps	 were
definitely	 closed,	 the	 mixture	 might	 have	 been	 leaned (the
i^
' necessary change might not have been enough for the
	 computer	 to
+
record),	 and	 the	 reduction	 in engine power was probably done,
although one sensor reading required for the program to determine
j
__...	 -
°ts
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4.
this was not available. It may be that the pilot executed the
procedure without using its display or performing the callouts.
f,.
The validation data contained twelve errors.
	 Sight errors
were detected outright. Two er.or.s were missed because a step
was dome incompletely and out--of-order. The program is designed
to catch either of these errors individually; however, if both
kinds of error are present in one step, the program will
categorize it as done incompletely. Of the remaining two errors,
one was turning a switch on, then off, then on, which was its
intended state. The program simply checked off the step that
required the switch to be on. At that time, the program did not
test for conditions to be maintained. For the second evaluation,
this shortcoming was fixed by the allowed field. The step that
corresponds to, say, a switch change also ALLOWS that switch to
change. When the step is checked off (i.e., DONE), its ALLOW
field will no lonGer be checked. Since no other step will ALLOW
the change, it would be detected if it occurs
j
	
	 The remaining error was an irrelevant action that would have
been detected had it happened during an identified phase of the
flight. Unfortunately, it happened between phases.
	 Ideally,
phases should overlap slightly so that the program has some phase
r
to test the action. In the second evaluation, this shortcoming
I°	 was fixed by having the ending of one phase force the next phase
t
u	
to begin.
u ..	 r .may ^. r std .-^' ,': ,'•".,
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The two types of error caught b
	 the
fi Yp	 g	 y	 program are the
r	 following.	 One additional omitted procedure (besides the one
;s
mentioned earlier) was detected. Nine inappropriate actions were
detected;	 most of these were activation of lights, etc. that
were inappropriate at the times they occurred.
	 Two instances
j	 were detected of lowering the landing gear at airspeeds higher
u than the maximum. Three instances were detected of not setting a
'I
control to the proper point. This included landing with partial
instead of full flaps and not fully testing the ailerons before
v	
takeoff.
a
#_ n
	
	
it might be expected that the program would find new errors
that had been missed in the earlier investigation. It did not.
While the program did turn up	 several
	
cases	 of	 steps
out-of-order, they were not really errors. For example, the step
`i
of retracting the flaps required so much time that the following
step -- a discrete switch change -- could be completed while
waiting for the flaps to retract. 	 No new, substantial errors
u
were found by the program.
Fval_uatign Two
The same methodology of derivation and validation data was
used in the second evaluation. The results are shown in Table 2.
s ^a
I
The one error the program did not detect was execution of.
two procedures when only one was needed (normal pre-landing and
single engine pre-landing). The only detectable difference
between these two is a single step -- the setting of the cowl
flaps. At the time the procedure was invoked, the cowl flaps
`	 }I
_ _	 ,,.^
	 •	 •	 ^ ^ r	 .^ ^ sue. iir'^.. ~^'^.`.rn ^•, ^"!'^<'s.' R ^ N...' y1 ^.
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were in the position (one-half) that a step of the procedure
requested they be. This step was immediately made DONE.
	 Later,
	
ID	 the pilot closed the flaps. The program, due to a simple bug inp	 9
an ALLOW field, accepted this change.
	 Eyentual.ly, the single
engine pre-landing procedure was finished. The pilot then went
through the normal pre--landing checklist, which resulted in no
changes save for a different cowl flap setting. This change was
detected as incorrect. If the simple bug were corrected, the
program would not accept the first cowl flap change.
In addition to errors, the program identified several
anomalies in pilot behavior.
	
The most frequent was steps
s
executed out-of--order. Expert opinion of these specific
situations ;•gas that no error occurred. For example, the landing
lights, navigation lights, and rotating beacon may be shut off in
any order (once the propellers have stopped spinning) even though
the procedure lists a specific order for them to be done.
32
^n
i.
These anomalies could be used for two kinds of improvements.
The first would be to improve the program. In the above example,
it would be better to express the ordering requirements
semantically (e.g., engine off precedes beacon off) rather than
by ordering. The second improvement could be to the procedures
themselves. For example, flaps may not be extended above certain
airspeeds.	 This restriction is not written in the
	 Aztec
procedures even though a similar restriction is written for
landing gear, which is the step preceding flap extension. Such
inadequacies could be found by coding the procedures in a
program.
x
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CONCLUSIONS
J
R
bp.
A model of procedure execution has been implemented in a
computer program. It was tested on aircraft simulator data and
was able to find practically all of the already known errors plus
locate some new ones. While this serves as a practical test of
the methodology, the implications of its aiding ability are more
significant.
Using the model as an aid would have two benefits.
	 The
first, and most obvious, would be to detect and eliminate a great
number of procedural errors. Perhaps surprisingly, this
improvement comes with no additional pilot workload. A correctly
functioning procedural aid would not need to communicate with the
pilot except when an error was made.
The second benefit of the ;model would be display control.
The	 latest generation aircraft are fitted with electronic
displays that presumably could or do display procedures. The
computer model of procedure execution could well tie used to
select and control displays, which might also result in an
additional reduction in pilot workload.
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1. Mixture controls	 full rich
2. Propellers	 full high rpm
3. Throttles	 set 2300 rpm
4. Propellers	 exercise 300 rpm max drop
a
	 S. Propol,lers	 feather check 500 rpm max drop
6. Magnetos	 check
9	 7.	 175 rpm max drop
8. 50 rpm max differential
9. Engine gauges	 check
10. oil pressuze
A	 11.	 oil temperature
12. cylinder head temperature
13. ammeter
14. vacuum
15. Throttles	 set 1000 rpm
Figure 1.	 Engine Run-up Procedure
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J r4
SCRIPT record
NAME string;
CAN—EXEC	 : rule; 
DONE_EXEC	 : rule; 
ABORT_EXEC	 : rule;
STATE	 : [U!qSTARTED,IN_PROGRESS,DONE,ABORTED];
ALLOWED,
DISALLOWED,
S
OP_ALLOWED,
INOP_ALLOWED,
J OP—DISALLOWED,INOP DISALLOWED : set of signal;
COMP :	 array[l..30]
	
of	 Uscript;
PARENT :	 Uscript;
SUB :	 Uscript;
end;
f
i
Figure 2.	 Script fields.
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Figure 4.	 Hierarchy of steps, procedures, phases, and FLIGHT.
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Refound Missed	 Undetectable	 New
Derivation 7	 0	 1	 0
n
Validation 8	 4	 0	 0
Table 1.	 Normal flight error analysis.
a
Refound errors were found by Rouse, Rouse, and Hammer and by	 the
program. Missed errors were found by the original investigators
but not by -the program.	 Undetectable errors were	 found	 by	 the
u original	 investigators	 using source of data 	 (i.e.,	 cockpit tape
recordings) that were not available to the program.	 New	 errors
were found by the program but not by the original investigators.
j
W
u
a
Refound Missed	 Undetectable	 New
E
Derivation 6	 0	 4	 3
1
Validation 9	 1	 4	 5
Table 2.	 Emergency flight error analysis.
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HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING IN A PROCESS CONTROL TASK
Nancy M. Morris and William B. Rouse
x,	
Center for Man-Machine Systems Research
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Atlanta, Georgia 30332
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ABSTRACT
u
	
	 The question of what the operator of a dynamic system needs
to know was investigated in an experiment using PLANT. a generic
= 1	 simulation of a dynamic production process. Knowledge of PLANT
was manipulated via different types of instruction, so that four
different groups were created:	 1) Minimal instructions only;
2) Minimal instructions + guidelines for operation (Procedures);
3) Minimal instructions + dyna=mic relationships (Principles);
4) Minimal instructions + Procedures + Principles. Subjects
controlled PLANT in a variety of situations which required
maintaining
	 production	 while also diagnosing familiar and
unfamiliar failures =
 Despite the fact that these manipulations
resulted in differences in subjects' knowledge as assessed via a
written test at the end of the experiment, instructions had no
effect upon achievement of the primary goal of production, or
	
is
upon subjects' ability to diagnose unfamiliar failures. However,
those groups receiving Procedures controlled the system in a more
stable manner. Possible reasons for the failure to find an
effect of Principles are presented, and the implications of these
^^-	 results for operator training and aiding are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
J The role	 of	 operators	 of	 engineering	 systems,	 such	 as
t; aircraft,	 ships, or process plants, has changed greatly in recent
,
ft
1 years and continues to change. 	 Much
	 of	 this	 change	 has	 been
precipitated by advances in automatic control of systems.
	 As the
tt ssJ
responsibility for control is shifted to computers, the
	 operator
becomes less a controller and more a monitor and,
	 if necessary, a
problem
	 solver	 [1].	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 operator
	
of	 an
v automatically
	 controlled system is called upon to exercise quite
different skills	 from
	
those
	 required	 of	 the	 operator
	
of	 a
;Y manually
	
controlled	 system.
	
Beyond	 some	 minimal
	 level,
q psychomotor ability becomes less essential, and greater	 emphasis
is	 placed	 upon	 the	 use of cognitive skills such as reasoning,
pattern matching, and problem solving.
u
Realizing this, a	 variety	 of	 individuals	 concerned	 with C
i
system	 desi gn	 and operator training have argued that one should a	 r,
U "consider the cognitive processes of the operator"
	 when	 dealing 'I
j ` with	 design	 and	 training issues	 (e.g.,	 [2],	 1311).	 Few people
would	 dispute	 this	 idea,	 because
	
the	 assertion	 that	 the j
j4
operator's	 needs
	 and capabilities should be considered seems to
be a reasonable one. 	 However,	 further development of the concept
' as stated here is required if it is to be practically useful. i
li From a theoretical viewpoint, theorists and researchers in
the fields of psychology and artificial intelligence as well as
ko
F% 0-
isi	 within the domain of process control have discussed 'human
PY
cognition in a variety of problem situations. A number of models
^Ru
t
»w
( P
Pa	
'
ge v
! of reasoning and decision making 	 have	 been	 offered,	 employing
r such	 concepts as schemas, 	 script;,,	 heuristics,
	 etc.	 (e.g.,	 [41,
[51,	 (61).	 The general	 opinion	 is	 that,	 when	 faced	 with	 a
problem,	 the	 human	 uses	 some	 understanding	 mechanisms which
govern the situation in making decisions.
A construct which appears in many writings is
	 that	 of	 the
"mental	 model"
	 of	 the process	 (e.g.,	 [71,	 [81,	 Mr	 [101,	 [111,
[121).	 Although, unfortunately,	 the	 term	 has	 sometimes	 teen
employed rather loosely, the mental model has generally been used
as a representation of knowledge of a system and its relationship
u,
== with the environment.	 A number of functions have been attributed
R
j to the mental model,
	 including guiding information seeking
	 [111,
[131,	 [141,	 aiding	 in	 pattern	 recognition	 [151,	 [161,	 and
anticipating future system states	 [171.
4	 ^
A	
'1 1One of the most articulate discussions of the	 relationships
^I
between
	
mental
	
models	 and	 problem	 solving	 in	 operation	 of
engineering systems has been 	 provided	 by	 Rasmussen	 [181.	 In
E	
11 ordinary,	 familiar	 circumstances, the human operator appears to
rely upon available heuristics and rules of operation. 	 In	 other	 j
1 words,	 the	 operator's	 behavior	 is	 ruIg=j ased.	 However,	 in
^.
v
unusual. situations for	 which	 rules	 do	 not	 apply,	 the	 human
operator
	
must	 reason	 at	 a	 knowledge-ba	 level,	 using 	 anp	 s e^	
1
understanding of the functioning of the system	 to	 determine	 an	 j
appropriate
	 course of action.	 Thus,	 different mental models may
be more or less appropriate, 	 depending upon the situation.
1"
k
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From a practical perspective, the idea of considering
operator cognitive processes and the notion that multi--level
reasoning may be required have attracted the inter e st of those
concerned with system desiqn and the training of operators [191.
Practitioners have found, however, that the manner in which
system designs and training programs should be structured so as
to incorporate these ideas is not at all straightforward. For
example, it has been suggested that one should strive.to
 support
the operator's reasoning and deci ion making process by providing
information that enhances the operator's model [161, [201. Yet.
translating this suggestion ..nto a specific course of acticn is
not an easy task.
Speculation has been directed at the nature of the mental
model associated with good performance. As a result of this
speculation, it has been assumed both implicitly and explicitly
that an important part of the mental model is a representation of
the tynamics of the system. Some educators have further stated
that such a representation (i.e., a "thorough understanding of
the dynamics of the system") is a requisite if the operator is to
be effective (e.g., (211). Based upon this assumption, training
programs may be aimed at providing the operatcr with the
appropriate mental model. usually via instruction in the theory
upon which the system is based and perhaps some experience with
simulators.	 Often the further assumption that such instruction
will lead to satisfactory performance is made.
ab
4F
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Unfortunately, although these approaches may be intuitively
appealing, there appears to be little in the way of empirical
support to guide the practitioner's efforts. For example, there
is lttle or no conclusive evidence that providing operators with
information about theoretical aspects of system functioning
enables them to be better operators. In fact. in research in
which subjects were given instruction in the theoretical basis of
system functioning there was no apparent advantage to having been
given such information (91, 	 1221,	 1231p	 [241.	 It is quite
possible that being able to control the system is not directly
related to an explicit !:ncwledge of system dynamics.
Alternatively, it is concei-vable that effective control behavior
may be related to having an understanding of system dynamics, but
that this understanding may be in the form of a "process feel"
and may not be obtained via verbal instruction. At any rate, in
spite of the lack of support for the practice, there is continued
emphasis on instructing operators in the theoretical basis of
system functioning.
The experiment reported in this paper was designed to
investiqate the question of what the operator of a dynamic system
needs to know in order to be effective. In particular, the value
of two different types of knowledge--knowledge of how to control
the system, and knowledge of how the system works--was explored.
The general approach was to manipulate system-relevant knowledge
via instructions, and examine the effects of this knowledge upon
performance.
4
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A PROCESS CONTROL TASK
This research was conducted in the context of PLANT, a
computer-driven generic simulation of a dynamic production
process. A graphic display for a sample PLANT problem is shown
in Figure 1, and the information display which accompanies the
graphic display is shown in Figure 2. A general description of
PLANT is presented here. Interested readers are referred to !251
for furt;;er details about the simulation.
P.Aferring to Fi gure 1, in this system there are nine tanks,
some cf which are currently connected by open valves (represented
by lines between tanks). Fluid enters the PLANT system at the
left and exits at the right as finished product. In general, the
PLANT operator's task is to supervise the flow of fluid through
the series of tanks interconnected by pumps, valves, and pipes so
as to produce an unspecified product. The operator may open and
close valves, adjust system input and output, check flows between
tanks, and order repairs of various PLANT components, in order to
achieve the primary goal of maximizing production.
Each operator action, such as opening a valve or adjusting
input,	 requires one time unit or iteration. PLANT is not updated
automatically in real time,	 but rather is at steady-state between
commands	 and is	 thus	 self-paced. Although it is possible for
:a
PLANT to run in a	 forced-paced	 mode and	 periodically	 update
automatically (e.g.,	 once every four seconds),	 the decision was
made to employ the self-paced mode of updating	 because	 of	 the
WOO
long resconse times characteristic of real processes.
Mzt
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As in real systems, although maximizing 	 production	 is	 the
nv primary	 goal	 of	 PLANT operation,	 the "physical" limitations of
the system (such as tank or
	 valve
	
capacity	 or	 reliability	 of
system
	
components)	 require that the PLANT operator be concerned
with secondary goals as well.
	 Among these
	
secondary
	 goals	 are
stabilization	 of	 the	 system,	 and	 detection,	 diagnosis,	 and
} compensation for system failures.	 Stability is required	 because
of	 the	 dynamic characteristics of the system* and the fact that
PLANT valves do not have infinite capacity.
	 Should the	 operator
fail to maintain stability, the PLANT safety system interv p rjes in
t order to protect the system from damage due to	 unsafe	 aprp,rating
practices.	 The	 safety system operates by automatically closing
valves	 (i.e.,	 "tripping" them)	 and/or stopping	 system	 input	 or
u output if flows or fluid . levels exceed desired ranges_
Possible PLANT failures include valve failures, pump
failures, tank ruptures, and failure of the safety system. Valve
and pump failures are fairly common, and involve a stoppage of
flow between connected tanks. While flow is stopped, the display
7
r d^	 remains unchanged and, therefore, the failed valve or pump
appears to be working.	 Detection and. diagnosis of a valve or
pump failure may be accomplished by noting a difference in
observed and expected fluid levels in tanks, and checking flows
Lp
through the suspected valve(s). 	 Repair involves sending a
'v	 "repair crew" to the site of the failure for a period of 5-10
3 *Each pair of connected tanks is modeled as a second-order system
with	 rate of	 flow	 and	 its derivative as state variables and
transition matrix determined by pipe	 and	 tank	 cross-sectional
areas,	 pipe	 lengths.	 and fl ,iid characteristics. 	 See	 [261	 for a
derivation of the state equations.
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iterations.
Tank ruptures and failure of the safety system are extremely
rare by design, and may occur only once during a subject's
experience with the system. As a result, these failures provide
means for studying operator problem solving in unfamiliar
situations. A tank rupture must be inferred from noting a loss
0
of resources from Oe system, and occupies the repair crew for 15
iterations, during which the tank is drained and "patched".
The nature of the failure of the safety system failure is
much less predictable due to the range of possible safety Z,,,-Ztem
actions; it may be manifest by a number of different syr.ptoms,
and may be intermittent. For example. failure of the safety
system could result in arbitrary "tripping" that should not be
difficult to detect if one understands the way in which the
t
safety system works. Thus, detection and diagnosis of a safety
system failure requires that the operator have some knowledge of a
the functioning of the . safety system and the underlying dynamics
of the process, because safety system actions are directly
	 t
t
related to PLANT dynamics. During repair, the safety system is
deactivated for 20 iterations and the operator is responsible for
	 i
PLANT safety.
With respect to
identify different
operator might have.
controlling a proc
that various control
the PLANT environment, it is possible
types of knowledge about PLANT which
At a minimum, he might know that he
ess, his goal is to maximize production,
options are available.
	 At another le
to
the
is
and
vel,
3,^i
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i
the	 PLANT	 operator	 may	 know	 "what	 to	 do"	 in	 certain
R
situations-• -i.e., he may have a set of procedures or rules which,
when
	
followed,
	
enable adequate control of the system.
	 Finally,i a
it is possible for the operator to have a knowledge of the way in
x
which PLANT "works",
	 including an understanding of the underlying
process dynamics and relationships between components.
In the research
	
described	 in	 the	 following	 section,	 an
attempt was ,.jade to "create" operators with these different types
of	 knowledge	 by	 providing	 naive	 subjects	 with	 differing
instructions.	 These
	
operators were then placed in familiar and
unfamiliar situations in order to provide them 	 opportunities
	 to
use	 the	 information	 they	 were given.	 During the planning and
conduct of this research: the following outcomes 	 were	 expected. j
i_a	 I First,	 it	 was	 anticipated	 that	 those operators w,th a set of
x procedures for controlling PLANT would be better in 	 ordinary	 or
familiar situations than those without such information. 	 Second,
't
^
it was predicted that those	 persons	 with	 an	 understanding
	 of
PLANT	 dynamics	 and principles would be better able to deal with
u
i n unfamiliar situations. {rn
I
METHOD
SUbjecta
J.
Junior and senior undergraduates at Georgia Institute of
Technology served as paid volunteer subjects. All 32 were
industrial and systems engineering majors, and had completed
courses in physics, dynamics, and higher level mathematics.
If
c. ^ -. -.^	 ^	 _ _ , ...	 s ^.-.^ yam. s ,ris/'.t-^,. `^v w: •,-,-mss ^, i .. ^ a ,; >	
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It is important to note 	 here	 that,	 although
	
the	 use	 of
students	 as	 subjects	 is	 often	 considered	 to	 compromise
credibility in applied 	 research.	 this	 subject	 population	 was
well-suited	 to	 the	 questions at hand.	 This is due to the fact
that operators in many systems	 (e.g., nuclear power	 plants)	 are
, required	 to	 complete	 a	 training	 program which is technically
equivalent	 to	 that	 required	 for	 a	 bachelor's	 degree	 in
u
engineering.	 Therefore,	 it.	 is	 argued that these students had
educational backgrounds comparable to actual operator trainees in
some domains.
^-	 1
Experir' er. 	 .1 Materials
?Y	
• Four sets of written instructions	 relevant	 to	 PLANT	 were
'` s
used	 in	 the	 experiment:	 Minimal	 instructions,	 Principles,
Procedures, and Relationships Between Principles and 	 Procedures.	
A
The	 format	 for	 the	 first	 three	 was	 similar,	 in	 that each	 {
`
consisted of text interspersed 	 with	 "self-test"	 questions	 and
(I
accompanied	 by • 1-2	 page	 summaries of important concepts. 	 The
fourth set, Relationships, differed, as it 	 was	 designed	 to	 be
inserted	 into	 Procedures	 for	 a,i	 experimental group which was 	 II'
xi
I
instructed	 using	 both	 Procedures	 and	 Principles.	 These	 i
° instructions	 were	 desi qned	 to represent the types of knowledge
about	 PLANT	 discussed	 earlier.	 (The	 complete	 sets	 of
d
instructional materials appear in Morris' 	 thesis	 [11.)
i
r
' Minimal j_nstruct i cns. were directed at what questions: what
kind of system is it, what is rho goal of operation, what can
happen, etc. As such, Min irna_ :n":tructions consisted of an
iM
t,
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introduction to the concept of a process plant, and a discussion
of the goals of PLANT oper^_, tion, operational constraints,
possible malfunctions, and command options available. Self-test
{ questions in the Minima l instructions were.directed at insuring
an understanding of the basics of PLANT operation (such as
opening valves and adjusting input and output) and the nature of
0
the PLANT safety system and possible PLAITT malfunctions.
K 	 '
Procedures told the PLANT operator row the system should be
controlled, in both general and more specific terms. First,
there were three heuristics useful for oeneral control of PLANT
L	 (e.g., '"keep all valves open"). The Procedure: also included a
u
set of six more specific sequences of control actions (i.e.,
	 t
s
procedures in the formal sense) appropriate for use in a number
of undesirable PLAINT states (e.q. , "output column too low") .
These "specific sequences" were not as specific as the procedures
	 $`
used in aviation, but were more like "guidelines", discussing
appropriate
	 types of control actions rather than specific
commands to be entered. The majority of the self-test questions
-	 required the subjects to determine which procedure was applicable
°	 in a depicted PLANT state (i.e., "Which procedure would you
choose in this situation?").
d These procedures were the product of	 numerous	 discussions
E
between the authors.	 each of whom had considerable experience in
6*
controlling PLANT and had developed	 his/her	 own strategy	 for
a^ doing	 so.	 Procedures were evaluated For their "reasonableness"
p by actually using them to control
	
the process; in	 instances
etr where	 alternative procedures had been generated, the sequence of
AW
t
tY
C14
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^ steps leading to the best performance	 (i.e.,	 the most	 g	 	 production
and fewest valve trips) 	 was selected.*
Principles included a presentation of
	 an	 approximation
	 of n
the	 state	 equations	 governing	 PLANT	 dynamics,	 and	 a verbal
interpretation of the equations in terms
	 of	 observable	 dynamic
relationships.	 In	 short,	 the	 Principles indirectly contained
information as to why FLA.1T should be	 controlled	 in	 a	 certain
manner.	 In	 writing
	
the Principles,	 an effort was made to make
them as meaningful and relevant to PLANT operation 	 as	 possible.
Discussion	 of	 abstract	 theory	 was	 avoided,	 and mathematical
expressions were alway s limited to simple 	 algebraic	 expressions
8
and	 accompanied	 by a discussion of their meaning and importance
to PLANT functioning. 	 For example. the instructions stated
	
that s
the	 PLANT	 was	 "sluggish", that flows tended to "oscillate over
time", and that input into a tank	 was	 "shared"
	 by	 the
	 valves {
leading	 from
	
it.	 Self-test	 questions required the subject to
apply the written information to the solution of problems
	 (e.g.,
"If	 tank	 B	 had a level of 75 and tank F had a level of 63 when
valve BF was opened, what would be your estimate of 	 the	 initial
f
flow rate for valve BF?").
Relationships B-atme-n Principles Znd 	 Procedures	 were	 more
1
directly
	
related	 to	 the	 "whys"	 of	 PLANT	 operation.	 In
Relatior ►ships,	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 information	 in	 the
*Throughout this paper, 	 reference is made	 both	 to	 the	 set	 of
procedural
	
instructions	 and	 to operational procedures found in
these	 instructions.	 To	 avoid	 confusion.	 references	 to	 the I
instruction	 set	 bagin	 with	 an	 upper-case	 letter	 (i.e.,
Procedures), whereas "procedures" refers to specific sequences of
steps found in the procedural instructions.
E
AXI
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Procedures	 was	 presented	 in terms of concepts discussed in the
Principles.	 Generally,	 subjects were informed,
	 "You
	 should	 (do
this)	 because
	 (the	 PLANT	 works this way)".	 As noted earlier,
!1
^ Relationships was inserted
	 in	 Procedures	 for	 an	 experimental
,
group which was instructed using Both Procedures and Principles.
Two	 multiple-choice
	 tests	 of	 the	 information
	 in	 the
instructions	 were	 also	 used.	 Test	 1 contained 22 items,
	 all
related to information
	 in
	
the	 Minimal
	 instructions.	 Test
	
2
consisted	 of	 54	 items, with approximately one third devoted to 6
each	 of
	
the	 major
	
types
	 of	 instruction	 (i.e.,	 Minimal,
Principles,	 and	 Procedures).	 Minimal questions on Test 2 were
virtually identical to those on Test 1, with minor modifications.
When	 creating	 procedural and principle questions, an effort was r
made to avoid asking 	 questions	 which
	 would	 be	 impossible
	 to
answer	 correctly
	 without having been explicitly told the answer
in	 instructions.	 For	 example,	 alternative
	 answers
	 often
consisted of a range of numbers rather than specific values.
Experimental Method E
Subjects served in a total of 12
	 sessions
	 each,
	 with	 the
s'
a
average	 length
	
of	 each
	 session	 being	 approximately 60 to 75
^I
minutes.	 With the exception of sessions 10 and
	 12	 (which
	 were
counterbalanced),
	
the	 order of presentation of PLANT production
J y runs was identical for all subjects.
	 The	 first	 eight	 sessions
were	 training	 sessions,	 in which subjects received written and
oral instructions and controlled PLANT in a variety of situations M
a for	 varying lenrt;;s of time.
	 Material presented in instructi.no
3fi
A
i
4
nl	 L
P
C
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was repeatedly reviewed during training sessions, and all of
subjects' questions were answered, if possible. in a manner
appropriate to a particular subject's experimental condition.
The last four sessions were experimental sessions, and were
identical in terms of initial PLANT configuration and length of
production run. Sessions 9 and 11 were "familiar" runs, in that
all failures which occurred were failures which the subjects had
experienced before (i.e., valve and pump failures). Sessions 10
and 12 were "unfamiliar" runs, each involving a malfunction which
had been discussed in instructional materials but which had never
occurred in a subject's experience (i.e., tank rupture and safety
system failure). The type of unfamiliar failure which occurred
was counterbalanced across subjects and within instructional
groups (described later). No instructions from the experimenter
were provided during the last four sessions, and no questions
from subje., ts were answered.
All subjects were presented with the Minimal instructions at
the beginning of session 1, and were allowed to read them with
the understanding that they would always have access to written
materials when controlling PLANT. Following an oral review of
the instructions with the experimenter, they were allowed to
control PLANT for approximately one hour. During their first
production run, they were encouraged to try all commands to , make
sure they understood how they worked.
a
6
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Session 2 consisted
	 of	 a	 brief	 review	 of	 commands
	 and
another	 one-hour production run.	 Test 1 was administered at the
end of session 2.
	 Since it was intended primarily as
	 a	 vehicle
for
	 discussion,
	 all correct and incorrect.answers were discussed
with subjects and important points were emphasized.
	 Sessions
	 3
through
	 7 were "problem" runs, with subjects assuming control of
the PLANT in a variety of unstable 	 situations.	 These	 problems
were	 created by the experimenter,
	 and represented situations for
3
which specific procedures were applicable.
	 Sessions 8 through 12
6
were	 "normal'
	
runs	 cr-	 -ore;	 as	 in	 sessions
	 1 and 2,
	 no
problems existed when t:., ^ubject began	 controlling
	
the	 PLANT.
Test 2 was administeree at the end of session 12.
f
Differentiation of experimental groups began in session 3.
At the beginning of session 3, two groups of eight subjects each
i
(groups B and D) were given Principles, and a third group (group
C) was given Procedures. The remaining eight subjects (group A)
were given no further written instructions. At the beginning of
	
session 5, subjects in group D were also given Procedures, with
	 4
Relationships Between Principles and Procedures inserted at the
appropriate point.
To summarize, group A received Minimal instructions;
	 group
•	 B received Minimal instructions and Principles; group C received
	
m
a	
Minimal instructions and Procedures;
	 group D received all
instructions.
	 These four groups may be viewed as cells in a
2 x 2 factorial desi gn, with each group receiving Procedures or
no Procedures, and Principles or no Principles.
v
u15
C
a
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A number of measures of subjects' performance were recorded.
Ir, addition to the obvious performance measure of production,
several intermediate measures were noted as indications of how
"elegantly" subjects achieved their goo*,'.. Among these were the
number of automatic valve trips, numb.a ,
 ,;' li.nit alarms (i.e.,
tank levels too high or too low), number, of valves open per
iteration, number of observations made prior to repairing a
failure, variability of fluid levels both within and between
columns, and frequencies of various commands.
RESULTS
Analysis or 7ariance was used a, the primary statistical
tool for data analysis. Performance measures were used as
dependent variables in three-way analyses with two between-groups
factors (Principles and Procedures) and one within-groups factor
or repeated measure (session). The following results are
presented to provide an overview of the experimental findings. A
more in-depth analysis of the results of this research may be
found in [1l.
When production achieved was used as the dependent variable
in the analysis, there was no effect of either Procedures or
Principles. The interaction also failed to reach significance.
Of all the other performance measures, there were three which
revealed significant differences related to instructions. These
were the average number of automatic valve trips, average number
of valves open at any point in time, and variance of fluid levels
(i.e., tank heights) within the system.
t
Iry
^a
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All of the significant effects upon these variables were
those of Procedures. Subjects provided Procedures (i.e., groups
C and D) generally experienced fewer automatic valve trips (.94
VS. .66 per iteration, P = .0343),. kept more valves open (15.79
vs. 14.58, ,8 = .0074), and had less %ariance in tank heights
(15.92 vs. 21.59, P = .0251) than did those subjects who did not
receive Procedures (i.e., groups A and B). None of the main
effects of principles nor any of the Principles x Procedures
interactions reached significance.
With regard to the unfamiliar failures, there was no
difference in groups' ability to detect and repair the tank
rupture or safety system failure. Only one person (from group D)
did not repair the tank rupture, and approximately half in each
instruc-tion group repaired the safety system. Subjects were
classified according to whether or not they repaired the failure
of the safety system and the analysis of variance was repeated.
(This classification is denoted by "fix-nofix" in the following
discussion.) When differences in the variables noted above were
analyzed in this manner, the following significant effects were
noted.
b
r
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First, those subjects who were able to determine that the
safety system had failed generally produced more, regardless of
session, than did those who did not make an appropriate diagnosis
(321.3 vs. 298.7 units per iteration, P = .0303). Furthermore,
"i_:c-= s" generally had fewer automatic valve trips (.68 vs.
	 .94
..	 prr ;toration. p = .0100), more valves open (15.64 vs. 14.68,
r
p
^ 	 = .._38), and less variance in tank heights (15.92 vs.
	 21.59,
(,1 P
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With respect to two of these variables, trips and height
variance, the interaction of Procedures and fix-nofix was also
significant (P = .0031 and P = .0061, respectively). Analysis of
the simple main effects of these interactions revealed that the
differences were among those Subjects who did not repair the
safety system.
	 In other words, those persons who repaired the
,. of ety system were equivalent in terms of trips and height
variance. regardless of whether or not they had been given
Procedures. Among those persons who did not repair the safety
â 	
system, however, those ;people who were not given Procedures had
imore valve trips 1,1.30 vs. 0.65) and height variance (28.3/ vs.
16.15) than those who received Procedures.
a
Differences in performance on Tess: 2 were also identified
via analysis of variance. When overall scores were compared,
there were significant main effects both of Procedures and
Principles	 (P = .0008	 and ,P = .001, respectively). 	 Groups
receiving Procedures scored higher than those receiving no
d
Procedures (80.44% vs.	 70.94$), and Principles groups scored
higher than those not receiving Principles (80.09% vs.	 71.30%).
The	 interaction	 of	 Procedures	 and	 Principles	 was not
statistically significant.
Comparing scores on test sections (i.e., questions related
to Minimal instructions, Procedures, and Principles), she
interactions of Procedures x section (P = .0128) and Principles x
section (P = .0003) were significant. Analysis of simple main
	
__	
4
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effects revealed that subjects receiving Procedures answered more
procedural questions correctly than those who did not receive
Procedures (82.53% vs. 61.33$), and subjects given Principles
correctly answered more questions related to system dynamics
(72.13% vs.	 48.07%).
R. Correlations betweer. all dependent measures were computed,
and a subset of these correlations may be found in Table to The
results of the analyses presented earlier clearly demonstrate the
existence of some strong relationships between variables. These
correlations are offered as a mechanism for inte grating the more
detailed results into an overall p icture which is discussed in
the following section.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Interpretation of- Results
There are three observations which may be made relative to
the. 'information presented in Table 1. First, the significant
correlations between production, trips, number of open valves,
and variance in tank heights are noteworthy because they provide
y	 support for the information found in Procedures. 	 The main
thrusts of these guidelines were aimed at keeping all valves open
and controlling differences in tank heights. Judging from the
relationships of height variance, etc. to overall production,
these emphases were well-founded. The point is necessarily made
because it is unreasonable to e r .-, ct operators to follow rules
which are not appropriate.
g
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Second, the high correlations between number of valve trips,
number of valves open. and va,"it:nce in tank heights reflect
characteristics of PLANT and provide justification for the
treatment of these variables as alternative measures of a single
construct. Thus, a "stable" PLANT is one in which most valves
are open, ti-ere are few valve trips, and there is little variance
in tank heights. The concept of PLANT stability is utilized in
the following paragraphs when differences in control performance
are discussed,
Third, perhaps the most important observation to be made
from an examination of Table 1 is that the relationship between
PLANT performance and Test 2 performance was not very strong.
The highest correlation between PLANT production and any measure
of Test 2 performance was .19, which was not significant. Of all
the correlations between Test 2 and PLANT performance. only the
relationship between number of open valves and score on the
procedural section of Test 2 achieved significance.
(
	
	
Between group variations	 on	 Test	 2	 indicate	 that
manipulation of instructions relative to PLANT was at least
-	 moderately successful in establishing different groups with
	
i
respect to PLANT-relevant knowledge. 	 In fact, the pattern of
 test results obtained is exactly as one might predict would occur
^s
	
	 if the manipulation were successful. It is also interesting to
note that, since the interaction of Principles and Procedures was
^	 not significant, tl,? effect of providing more than one set of
instructions was approximately additive.
k
.° ^ ^.	 °	
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In contrast to the results on Test 2, instructions were not
Nt	
1^ li
f
i -	 as	 clearly
	 reflected in PLANT performance.
	 For example.
instructions had no effect upon how much subjects were able to
	 a
produce. Regardless of instructions, groups were able to achieve
1	 '
comparable production scores. Although production was comparable:.	 n
across groups, those groups receiving 71 rocedures (-roups C and D)
,.	 controlled PLANT in a more stable manner than did the groups
i
u without Procedures (groups A and B). The provision of Principles
did not seem to improve subjects' control behavior under normal
circumstance^.
-j
j
Variations in instructions had no effect upon whether or not
7
ek
a	 subject
	 was able to correctly diagnose the unfamiliar failure
of	 the	 safety	 system.
	 Judging
	 from	 the analysis	 of	 the
' Procedures
	 x	 fix-nofix	 interaction,	 a stable	 system
	 was	 f
apparently a necessaryprerequisite to finding this	 malfunction.
This	 is	 not surprising,
	 since there would be a greater contrast
between "normal" and "abnormal" in such a system. However,
	 it is	
tv
t,
also	 apparent	 that	 having a stable system was not a sufficient
ucondition for
	
the	 location	 of	 the	 safety system
	 failure.Y
Ir
Procedures
	 enabled	 subjects	 to	 have a more stable system, but
	 !
only half of those subjects	 receiving	 Procedures
i
repaired	 the
safety system.
1 i} Restatement of Experimental Hypotheses
Now, consider the results of this experiment in light of the
experimental hypotheses stated earlier. To reiterate, the first
1	 hypothesis was that those groups receiving Procedures (i.e.,
n	
^¢
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groups C and D) would be better at controlling PLANT in ordinary
circumstances than those not provided Procedures (i.e., groups A
and B). The data obtained in this research support this
hypothesis. Although there were no differences between groups in
overall production achieved, subjects in groups C and D generally
controlled PLANT in a more stable manner, and were more
consistent with each other with respect to most dependent
measures. This evidence indicates (to no 9 reat surprise) thatP
proceduralization may indeed be a means of providing operators
i
with an effective strategy, and thus supports the common practice
of providing operators with procedures.
The second hypothesis was that persons with an understanding
of the dynamics of PLANT as described in Principles (i.e., groups
B and D, or at least group D) would perform better in unusual
circumstances in which available procedures were not applicable.
1
The results reported here provide absolutely no support for this
hypothesis.	 As reported earlier, only one person failed to
u .
repair the unfamiliar tank rupture, and approximately half of the
subjects in each instruction group repaired the faiied safety
system. In retrospect, all subjects had been told in the Minimal
	 j
instructions how to detect a tank rupture, so this failure to
m	
note a difference between groups in repair of the tank rupture is
not too surprising;	 however, the pattern of results obtained 	
fi
with the safety system failure was not expected, and is difficult
to explain.
^1a
I
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The provision of Principles did not insure that subjects
	 r^
would be able to deal with the unfamiliar safety system failure.
	
U	 Neither did Principles appear to be	 useful	 in	 ordinary
a
situations, as group B was no better than group A in controlling
	
v'	 PLANT. In light of the performance on Test 2 it may be stated
	 t9	 P	 ► 	 Y
i
that this does not reflect a failure on the part of subjects to
learn the material. Nor does it appear that this failure to find
an effect may be attributed merely to failure to achieve the
traditionally accepted significance level of .05. In all cases,
a measured differences due to an effect of Principles were small,
and the probabilities of these differences being due to chance
were quite large.
Why not Principles?
1
} There are two questions which immediately come to mind 	 when
considering	 the	 failure	 to	 find	 support	 for	 the	 second	 I
hypothesis.	 The first is this:	 Why did Principles fail to help?
it	 is	 necessary	 to address this question because of prevailing
^t
e
opinion as to the	 value	 of	 such	 a	 knowledge--the	 Principles
°` .9hould	 have	 helped.	 In	 fact, this attitude is so firmly held
w
ti that some may even be led to discount the results reported 	 here,
because
	
"everyone knows that you need to understand how a zystem
{ works in order to control
	
i}".
In considering this question of why the provision of
I"	 Principles did not lead to better performance, it is important to
note	 triese results do not appear to represent an isolated
	 I
case. 	 they are in agreement with the results of other
l	 ;
h.	
-
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a
	research in which knowledge of theory was found to have little or
	 r'
no relationship to task performance 191, 1221, 1231, 1241, 1271.
in fact, a survey of relevant literature failed to reveal any
s. reports in which a statistically significant advantage of such
knowledge was reported, although many authors stated or implied
that there was such an advantage.
One apprcach to explaining these results might be to argue
that the off acts of knowledge of theoretical principles may be
f
indirect and subtle, and thus not directly measurable. Indeed, a
number of more subtle effects seem feasible, tbough a detailed
°i
	
	 examination of this data fails to support them. For example, a
general understanding of the functioning of a system may serve as
r
a frame of reference from which prricedures may be more meaningful
and better understood.	 Understanding how the system works may
^j
have a motivational effect upon operators. 	 Although	 such
	 "S
^	 r
knowledge may not be useful to a group of operators as a whole,
some individuals may find this information extremely useful.
,r j	 An additional explanation for this consistent failure to
U	 ti
find an advantage of theoretical instruction may be in terms of
different types of knowledge.	 The results of this research
r
suggest that knowledge of a system may be represented in more
than one form, and that any given person's knowledge may consist
of multiple representations.	 Thus, knowledge of "facts", as
4
measured by a verbal test, and knowledge of how to control a
system, as manifest by adequate control performance, may not be
strongly related and may be embodied in different forms and thus
-,	 expressed in different ways. The low correlaticns between Test 2
Inv i
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scores and PLANT performance measures are consistent with this
interpretation.
If this is the case, then the impact of Principles may have
. been minimal because the information was not in a form that was
directly usable by subjects (i.e., was not directly related to
what they should be able to do. as opposed to what they should
o
	
^	 ^;now) . Rather, in order to apply the information appropriately,
	
F.	
the operator first had to go through w deductive process. Either
	
.	 people did not attempt to do so, or did try but could not
	 .`
Letermine an appropriate course of action. In the absence of
j	 successful reasoning, the Principles could not be useful.
t
Alternatives to Principles
The second question which arises when considering these
	
u	 results is this: If telling operators how the system works does
not insure that they will be able to deal with unanticipated
	 s
events, then what can be done to provide such assurance? This
reflects a pressing need in industry, because it is precisely for
the	 purpose
	
of handling unforeseen situations that human
I
operators are employed. Accordingly, an attempt will be made to
address this issue here.	 1
9
E	°	 It is appropriate to recall the concept of multiple levels
	
04<	
of reasoning discussed earlier.
	 People commonly engage in
	
j	
rule-based behavior when controlling familiar systems under
	 !
normal conditions, but should resort to knowledge-based behavior
	 II
in unusual. circumstances, using an understanding of the way the
system works to determine what should be done. Therefore, if a
^d
r
rPage 25
i{
i
r
1
OF POOR QUALITY
person has a knowledge base sufficient to support knowledge-based
reasoning, this information should be used in unfamiliar
situations. Although this seems to be a reasonable description
of what should occur, the indications from this research are that
this describes the ideal and not what actually takes place. As
we have seen, knowledge and opportunity do not guarantee that
people will engage in knowledge-based reasoning and reach an
appropriate conclusion.
t
It seems that certain conditions must be met for a person to
solve an unfamiliar problem successfully. First, he or she must
have an adequate knowledge base. Second, it must be apparent
that available rules do not apply and that reasoning about the
c
problem is required. Third, the person must be able to use the
information in the knowledge base appropriately to reach a
i
r
conclusion.	 4
The nature of this "adequate" knowledge base was the primary
quastion pursued in this research. and the partial answer
obtained was "less than one might suppose". Some subjects from
groups A and C found the safety system failure, and were
generally quite good at controlling PLANT, yet could not answer
	 i
questions on Test 2 about PLANT functioning. While it cannot be
stated that these persons had no ideas of how PLANT works, it can
be said that their knowledge of PLANT was at least less detailed
than the information contained in Principles. 	 Therefore, it i
appears that the importance of a detailed theoretical knowledge
of a --stem to an operator's control behavior 	 has	 been
overe ►ai:,aisized in training, and this emphasis should be reduced.	 t
I
E,
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Therefore, it may be necessary to provide the operator some
assistance at the time of the unanticipated event, possibly
online. One form of assistance could be to adequately inform the
operator that an unusual condition existed. Other authors have
indicated that it might also be necessary to help him to pinpoint
the location of the problem. Finally, it could be necessary to
guide the operator in his reasoning process, to increase the
likelihood that an approplA ate conclusion will be reached.
Research in the areas of decision making and decision aiding is
moving '_r. the direction espoused in this paragraph [281.
However, in; existing operator support systems of the type
envisioned here are mainly in the conceptual Stage and little
evaluative data is available.
Hu mt^ a ry
In summary, the question of what an operator needs to know
is	 extremely	 important to those responsible for operator
training. Traditionally, operators have been required to learn a'
i
great deal about the theoretical aspects of system functioning,
in the hopes of insuring that they can deal with unanticipated
events.	 Available research evidence suggest that this emphasis	 !i
,I
on the importance of theoretical knowledge of the system is
disproportionate to the actual value of such knowledge, and that
more attention should be devoted 	 to	 providing	 operators
assistance during abnormal conditions. 	 In other words, less
emphasis should be placed on answering the question of "What does
a
the operator need to know?" and more on the questions of "What
should op-orators  be able to do?" and "How can we hr_, lthem to use	 ?y
f
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the knowledge they have?"
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Figure 1. Sample graphic PLANT display.
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Figure 2. PLANT information display.
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Table 1
tl
jj
Correlations Between Dependent Measures
• J
PROD	 TRIPS
	 NOPEN c	VAR
	 FIX 	 TEST2 f
 SECTlg
 SECT2
j
TRIPS -.437*
1k
NOPEN .673*	
-.706* F
4
VAR -.574*	 .967*	 -.768*
sl
r1:., -.429*	 .141	 -.234
	
.218
a
TEST2 .191	 -.200	 .313	 -.258	 .107
SECT1 -.021
	
.261	 -.189
	 .268	 -.100
	
.148 i
SECT2 .190	 -.238	 .366*
	 -.292	 .225
	 .860*	 .040
}
!r J y
SECT3 .105	 -.161	 .157	 -.197	 -.056
	 .661*	 -.022	 .225
R aPROD = average production/iteration.
bTRIPS = number of automatic valve trips/iteration.
^I
cNOPEN = average number of valves open/iteration. ^.
dVAR
I
= variance of tank heights in PLANT.e
FIX = average time to diagnose valve and pump failures.
fTEST2 = overall score on Test 2. i
g StiCTl, SECT2,	 SECT3 = scores
	
(% correct)	 on subsections of f
r°j Test 2; SECT1 = minimal questions, SECT2 = procedural
questions, SECT3 = principles questions. i
I*.. .05
iSd
